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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. D. SHELLEDY, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
EDWARD LORE, ALAN PARSONS, ERIN 
PARSONS, ROY HOCKIN, HARRY 
DECKERED, KENT C. BANGERTER, 
LLOYD V. McBRIDE, DAVID C. KUNTZ, 
individual, MERIT DISTRIBUTING 
INC., a Utah corporation, STATE 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants, Respondents. 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellant E. D. Shelledy, by and through his attorney of record, 
Eric P. Hartman, respectfully petitions the Court to grant a 
rehearing of its opinion in the above-captioned appeal dated 
April 14, 1992. This Petition attempts to state points of law or 
fact which Shelledy believes the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended. 
POINT I . 













GOVERNMENT AS GRANTOR TO SHELLEDY. 
The Court has failed to address the important factual 
distinction between this case and Kemmerer Coal Co. v. BYU, 
723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983). In Kemmerer, the 10th Circuit was 
dealing with a situation involving only private parties and their 
1 
Supreme Court No. 900074 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
OF APPELLANT E. D. 
SHELLEDY 
property rights. In the instant action; the Court is dealing 
with a situation involving the federal government and its 
grantee, Shelledy. 
This factual difference from Kemmezfer is important in at 
least two respects: First, because the federal government owned 
the property, under federal law the limitations statutes could 
not be applied to the government's grantee, irrespective of 
whether it was sound law under the fact}s of Kemmerer. See, 
Appellant's Brief, Point IV, pp. 14-15. 
Second, it deprived Salt Lake Courtty of any jurisdiction 
over the property while title rested in the Small Business 
Administration (hereafter SBA). See, Appellant's Reply Brief, 
Point III, pp. 6-8. 
Because of the Court's apparent basis for its ruling, more 
discussion is needed regarding the first point, that of the 
impermissibility of applying a statute bf limitations to the 
federal government's grantee to include tti-me during which title 
was in the federal government. 
This Court apparently accepts the conclusion that the 1984 
tax sale of the property while title wa£ in the SBA was void 
under the authority of United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 
61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.ed. 1327 (1940), and that no limitations 
could run against the SBA because of i^ s sovereign immunity. 
Clearly, the facts of this case fall squarely within the 
parameters of the Alabama holding. 
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However, it appears to be the Court's ruling that although 
the limitations period could not run against the SBA while they 
held title to the property, Shelledy may not assert that point to 
prove his chain of title because of the standing doctrine 
espoused in Kemmerer and that, therefore, the limitations period 
ran as to Shelledy even while the property was owned by the SBA. 
Slip Op. at p. 5. 
Although Shelledy believes that standing was not a 
legitimate issue in Kemmerer, but merely an issue-avoidance 
device invoked by the 10th Circuit to side-step a more difficult 
Constitutional issue (when a due process claim may be barred by 
limitations), it is clear that under well-established federal law 
neither standing nor any other legal construct can be raised to 
deprive the federal government's grantee of his rights to the 
transferred property, since this impinges on the sovereign's 
rights to manage and dispose of its property. Redfield v. Parks, 
132 U.S. 239, 33 L.ed. 327 (1889); Simmons v. Ogle, 105 U.S. 271, 
26 L.ed. 1087 (1881); Oaksmith v. Johnston, 92 U.S. 343, 23 L.ed. 
682 (1875); Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall [80 U.S.] 92, 20 L.ed. 
534 (1871); Lindsev v. Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet [31 U.S.] 666 
(1832). Specifically, no limitations period may run against the 
grantee, except that which may begin and fully run its course 
after the government conveys legal title to the property. See, 
Appellant's Brief, Point IV, pp. 14-15; Simmons v. Ogle, supra. 
To conclude otherwise would be to allow the county to place an 
impermissible burden on the property rights of the federal 
3 
government which only the express consent of Congress may allow. 
This is a fundamental tenet of sovereign immunity which has been 
recognized in this country since McCulloch v. Maryland. 
In Simmons v. Ogle, suprar the United States Supreme Court 
was faced with a dispute between a party (Ogle) who admittedly 
possessed property for over thirty years versus a party (Simmons) 
who claimed title through a subsequent patent from the United 
States. The Court stated: 
As regards the weight to be given to the 
possession of Ogle, it is to be considered 
that whether he had the equitable right or 
not, neither the Statute of Limitations nor 
the equitable doctrine of lapse of time could 
begin to have effect against any one until 
Simmons purchased of the United States and 
obtained his patent in 1874, for up to that 
time the legal title was undeniably in the 
United States. If this had not been so Ogle 
would have successfully pleaded the Statute 
of Limitations against Simmons in the action 
at law. No laches could be imputed to 
Simmons, who brought suit very soon after he 
received his patent. Nor can laches be 
imputed to the United States, either as a 
matter of law or on any moral or equitable 
principles. 
IdL, at 105 U.S. 273. 
Perhaps the seminal case establishing the absolute 
prohibition on a State's attempt to infringe on the rights of the 
government's grantee to the full enjoyment of the title acquired 
from the federal sovereign is Gibson v. Chouteau. 13 Wall. [80 
U.S.] 92, 20 L.Ed. 534 (1871). In Gibson, the United States 
Supreme Court, when confronted with the claim that a limitations 
statute divested title from the federal government's grantee 
prior to legal title being conveyed, stated: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that 
statues of limitation do not run against the 
State. That no laches can be imputed to the 
king, and that no time can bar his rights, 
was the maxim of the common law, and was 
founded on the principle of public policy, 
that as he was occupied with the cares of 
government he ought not to suffer from the 
negligence of his officers and servants. The 
principle is applicable to all governments, 
which must necessarily act through numerous 
agents, and is essential to a preservation of 
the interests and property of the public. It 
is upon this principle that in this country 
the statutes of a State prescribing periods 
within which rights must be prosecuted are 
not held to embrace the State itself, unless 
it is expressly designated or the mischiefs 
to be remedied are of such a nature that it 
must necessarily be included. As legislation 
of a State can only apply to persons and 
things over which the State has jurisdiction, 
the United States are also necessarily 
excluded from the operation of such statutes. 
[Citations omitted.] 
With respect to the public domain, the 
Constitution vests in Congress the power of 
disposition and of making all needful rules 
and regulations. That power is subject to no 
limitations. Congress has the absolute right 
to prescribe the times, the conditions, and 
the mode of transferring this property, or 
any part of it, and to designate the persons 
to whom the transfer shall be made. No State 
legislation can interfere with this right or 
embarrass its exercise; .... 
Id. at 13 Wall [80 U.S.] 99 [emphasis added]. 
The United States Supreme Court in Gibson went on to address 
the needed protection of the government's grantee: 
The same principle which forbids any State 
legislation interfering with the power of 
Congress to dispose of the public property of 
the United States, also forbids any 
legislation depriving the grantees of the 
United States of the possession and enjoyment 
of the property granted.... The consummation 
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of the title is not a matter which the 
grantees can control, but one which rests 
entirely with the government. With the legal 
title, when transferred, goes the right to 
possess and enjoy the land, |and it would 
amount to a denial of the power of disposal 
in Congress if these benefits, which should 
follow upon the acquisition of that title, 
could be forfeited because tjhev were not 
asserted before that title was issued. 
Id. at 13 Wall [80 U.S.] 100 [emphasis added]. 
The Court concluded that the power of Congress in the 
disposition of federal properties cannot be defeated under any 
State legislation, no matter how asserted. Id. at 13 Wall [80 
U.S.] 103-104. 
Similarly, in Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239, 33 L.ed. 327 
(1889), the United States Supreme Court rejected any notion that 
limitations could defeat the authority of the federal government 
in managing and disposing of its property interests. Accord, 
Lindsev v. Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet. [31 U.S.] 666 (1832). Also, 
on at least two occasions, Utah's Supreme Court has recognized 
the binding authority of Gibson and Redfield in this State. See, 
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178 (1915); Steele 
v. Bolev, 7 Utah 64, 24 P. 755 (1890). 
As to the second legal result of the factual difference 
between Kemmerer and the instant case, Petitioner will restate 
only the basic thrust of the point, refetring the court to the 
discussion in his Briefs. 
Since Salt Lake County was without jurisdiction over the 
property, it was not an authority which qould pass good title 
under any circumstances, and was, therefore, not within the 
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permissible scope of the special statutes of limitations 
recognized by this Court in Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d. 310, 283 
P.2d 884 (1955). See, Appellant's Brief, Point IV, pp. 11-14. 
Thus, just as the States (or private interests) in the 
above-cited cases could not, by either legislation or equitable 
doctrines, impinge or restrict in any way the federal 
government's authority to manage and dispose of its property 
interests and its grantee's rights to receive the property absent 
the express consent of Congress, neither Salt Lake County nor the 
State of Utah, through limitations statutes, standing doctrine, 
or any other legal construct, may prevent the SBA from conveying 
all its right, title and interest in the subject property to 
Shelledy, nor bar Shelledy from the use and enjoyment of that 
property. 
POINT I I . 
THE TAX DEED WAS VOID, NOT MERELY VOIDABLE. 
This Court states in its opinion that "The SBA may have been 
able to avoid the 1984 tax sale of its property on the authority 
of Alabama, but it did not attempt to do so." This' is a 
misapprehension of the law set forth in United States v. Alabama, 
supra, and the impact on any legal obligation of the SBA. 
The Alabama decision held that the tax sale therein, 
factually indistinguishable from the sale in the instant case, 
was void, not merely voidable, because the county therein lacked 
jurisdiction over the property. 
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As stated in the trial court below and in briefs before this 
Court, a void deed is a nullity, with no legal effect, as opposed 
to one which is merely voidable. A merely voidable deed has 
legal effect until challenged and may be strengthened by a 
statute of limitations. A deed which is void, as here, cannot 
even carry any basis of title upon which a bona fide purchaser 
may rely. Bennion Insurance Co. v. 1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339 
(Utah 1977) . 
The United States Supreme Court, in Redfield v. Parksf 
supra, concluded that short statutes of limitations adopted by 
states to strengthen tax titles could not apply to deeds void on 
their face, reversing a state court ruling to the contrary. Id. 
at 132 U.S. 251-252. Petitioner submits that deeds which are 
void ab initio because of a lack of jurisdiction in the taxing 
authority cannot be given life by such statutes. Support, Baxter 
v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (UtahApp. 
1989). 
Thus, the Court's statement that the SBA chose not to set 
aside the 1984 tax deed incorrectly assumes that the SBA needed 
to take action against a deed which was void ab initio. This 
burden does not fall on any owner whose title has purportedly 
been cut off by such void deed, and certainly cannot be imposed 
on the SBA without the consent of Congressf 
POINT III. 
THE LAW ON THIRD PARTY STANDING IS MET HEREIN. 
Although the Petitioner steadfastly believes that standing 
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is not a legitimate issue in this case, both because of the 
federal prohibitions on states' abilities to impinge on federal 
property rights, discussed above, and because Shelledy does not 
believe he is asserting the constitutional rights of another, but 
merely proving his chain of title, Petitioner believes the Court 
has glossed over the application of the standards of assertion of 
1us tertii when viewed under the facts of this case. 
The Court states: 
None of the above [three factors looked at] 
are present in the instant case. No 
substantial relationship exists between 
Shelledy and the SBA; the SBA has never been 
precluded from asserting its immune status; 
and finally, there has been no dilution of 
Shelledy's constitutional rights. 
Slip Op. at page 6. 
It should first be noted that the three factors cited by the 
court as the standard in allowing the assertion of what have been 
termed 1us tertii third party rights issues are not a conjunctive 
preliminary test, but are merely three recurring themes which 
appear in most of these types of cases, and not all three are 
cited in each case. Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus 
Tertii, 88 Harv. L.Rev. 423, 425 (1975). 
As regards the first factor, Shelledy paid valuable 
consideration to acquire all the SBA's right, title and interest 
in the property in question and the SBA assumed it conveyed those 
interests to Shelledy. Shelledy cannot scarcely conceive of a 
more substantial relationship between parties. 
9 
In fact, it is precisely such vendor-vendee status that 
Lawrence Tribe has cited as a large sub-class of "special 
relationship" jus tertii cases which can be more rationally 
thought of as first-party rights cases, where a litigant seeks to 
avoid restrictions which directly impair his freedom to interact 
with the third person. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §3-19 
(2nd ed. 1988). Such vendor-vendee c^ses include Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (white seller attacking racially 
restrictive covenants); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) 
(retailer attacking sex-discriminating beer sales laws); and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (sale of contraceptives 
to unmarried couples). 
Similarly, Professor Henry Monaghan has viewed these vendor-
vendee cases as first-party rights cases, suggesting that the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects the litigant against economic injury 
resulting from unjustified discriminatipn against the third 
persons with whom he sought to interact. Monaghan, Third Party 
Standing, 84 Colum. L.Rev. 277 (1984) atl 282, 297-299. Such a 
due process violation is suggested by the Court's opinion holding 
that the SBA cannot convey, and Shelledy bannot acquire, all of 
the SBA's right, title and interest in the property at issue. 
As to the second factor, the SBA conveyed all their right 
title and interest to the property to Shelledy and, in all 
likelihood, would have itself been subject to a standing 
challenge had they been a party to this action seeking to quiet 
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Shelledy's title. Thus, it would be impossible for the SBA to 
assert its own constitutional rights, because at the time they 
presumed to have no interest in the property. Therefore, the 
second factor is also satisfied under the facts herein. 
On the third point, if the assertion of 1us tertii were not 
permitted herein, it is clear that the SBA's constitutional 
rights would be diluted to an impermissible degree. (The Court's 
opinion states that Shelledy's constitutional rights are not 
diluted, but Petitioner assumes this was a mere dictation error 
and that the Court meant the SBA's rights.) There is no doubt 
that this Court's ruling restricts the SBA's ability to alienate 
its property interests, which is contrary to established federal 
law as stated above in Point I. The end result of the Court's 
ruling is that the SBA cannot convey all its right, title and 
interest to such a piece of property, and that, even without 
consent from Congress, local governments may burden the federal 
government with the onerous task of suing to remove any such 
cloud on their properties prior to disposing of them or face the 
prospect that the local government has rendered the properties 
valueless. Such a burden cannot be imposed on the federal 
government unless Congress expressly permits it (which it 
hasn't), and not to allow the federal government's grantee to 
assert all rights held by its grantor in order to establish the 




IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S RULING ARE UNTENABLE. 
Although the Court is relying on a 10th Circuit opinion 
purporting to be interpreting Utah law, Petitioner urges the 
Court to disavow Kemmerer or limit its holding to the peculiar 
facts involved therein, or acknowledge that that standard cannot 
be applied in the instant action. 
The current opinion of this Court leads to some very 
troubling implications: 
1. A state or local government tnay tell the federal 
government how it must manage and dispose of its property 
interests, even though such power is plenary in the Congress of 
the United States. 
2. A local taxing authority may proceed to assess taxes 
on, and convey by tax deed, property which is admittedly exempt 
because owned by the United States, and subsequently declare that 
the United States' grantee has received nothing in its deed from 
the United States. 
3. The Court's ruling impliedly overrules the Utah Court 
of Appeals' decision in Baxter v. , Utah Department of 
Transportation, supra
 f since the ruling in that case required the 
conclusion that a county which lacked jurisdiction over the 
property could not create valid title through a tax sale-under 
any circumstance. 
4. Acceptance of Kemmerer's standing doctrine would result 
in the following unusual situation: Suppose a titleholder 
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receives no notice of an impending tax sale (a clear due process 
violation). If the titleholder on the day after the final tax 
sale either dies or conveys his title to a third party, his 
estate or his grantee cannot raise the due process issue and 
clear their title because it was not their constitutional rights 
which were violated. 
5. Under this Court's ruling, the SBA should be considered 
a necessary party and joined in this proceeding under Rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Clearly, the SBA held title 
to the property as against the void tax deed pursuant to the 
authority of United States v. Alabama, supra. Since this Court 
holds that the SBA could not convey that title to Shelledy 
because of the Court's standing interpretation, the SBA must 
therefore retain some right, title and interest in the property 
and must be joined under Rule 19 in order to adjudicate all 
interests in the subject property. Certainly, complete relief 
cannot be accorded Shelledy without the SBA's joinder. This is 
so because the SBA purported to convey, and Shelledy presumed to 
receive, all the SBA's right, title and interest in the property, 
but this Court has now ruled that it did not, or could not, make 
such a complete conveyance. This also subjects Shelledy to the 
substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations, since in 
an action to recover his consideration from the SBA, a federal 
court could likely hold that the SBA in fact did convey all its 
right, title and interest to Shelley. Thus, the SBA is a 
necessary party under Rule 19(a) and it should be ordered joined 
13 
as a party so that complete relief may be provided the parties. 
Support, Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990.). 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner believes the Court has too readily adopted the 
standing theories espoused in the Kemmerer case. Under 
established federal law, the Kemmerer rationale cannot be applied 
to the facts of this case where a federal agency with all the 
rights and immunities of the United States is the grantor of the 
property. No legal theory, state statutes, or equitable 
doctrines may be used to impair the federal government's 
authority to manage and dispose of its property. Under the facts 
of this case, title to the property must be quieted in Shelledy 
and taxes assessed during ownership by the SBA and paid by 
Shelledy under protest must be refunded. 
Although Petitioner is, like this Court, concerned about 
potential impacts on local revenue bases, such concerns are most 
appropriately, and can only be, addressed to the Congress of the 
Unites States. 
Respectfully submitted this 2?ff day of April, 1992. 
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